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The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, commonly referred to as Daesh, has taken the world 
by storm and is exhibiting no signs of relenting. Desperate to degrade and ultimately 
destroy Daesh, yet afraid to mire itself in another Middle Eastern conflict, the United 
States is relying on a minimalist strategy through military partnerships and air support. 
This research contends that this fairly conventional approach is ineffective. This thesis 
offers an alternative strategy to counter Daesh by utilizing social network analysis (SNA) 
to analyze Daesh’s network and then apply principles of social movement theory (SMT) 
to encourage Daesh’s implosion. 
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I. ISLAMIC STATE: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), locally referred to as ad-Dawlah 
al-Islāmīyah fī al-’Irāq wash-Shām, or Daesh,1 has reportedly executed 1,969 civilians in 
Syria alone between June 28, 2014 and December 27, 2014 according to the Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights.2 Iraqi Body Count (IBC) attributes 4,325 civilian deaths 
to Daesh in 2014, contributing to the highest total casualty numbers seen in Iraq since 
2006–2007. In reality, these numbers are likely much higher; however, accurate reporting 
from war-torn regions is difficult at best.3 Beyond the caliphate’s self-designated borders, 
Daesh-sanctioned lone-wolf operations have claimed lives in Canada, France, Norway, 
and Australia. At the time of this writing, there appears to be no end in sight to the 
violence as Daesh continues to call for attacks on kuffar, or non-believers.  
Some argue that the United States unwittingly created Daesh as a result of a poor 
foreign policy with blatant misinformation from the Bush Administration to drag the 
United States into a war against Saddam Hussein,4 while others argue that President 
Obama’s weak foreign policy has allowed Daesh to flourish following the 2011 
American troop withdraw from Iraq.5 The correct answer is likely a combination of the 
two; however, neither argument is prescriptively relevant. Dwelling on past foreign 
policy blunders does little, if anything, to alter the present and will certainly not help in 
                                                 
1 The U.S. administration uses the acronym ISIL. Elsewhere, such as in the mainstream media, it is 
referred to as the Islamic State (IS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It is commonly referred to 
as Daesh in the Middle East. This thesis elects to use the Middle Eastern term Daesh. 
2 Sohranas, “More than 1200 Civilians Executed by IS since the Declaration of Its Own ‘Caliphate,’” 
Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, February 28, 2015, accessed March 4, 2015. 
http://syriahr.com/en/2015/02/more-than-1200-civilians-executed-by-is-since-the-declaration-of-its-own-
caliphate/.  
3 “Iraq 2014:  Civilian Deaths Almost Doubling Year on Year,” Iraq Body Count, January 1, 2015, 
accessed on March 3, 2015. https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2014/.  
4 VICE News. How the US Created the Islamic State: Talking Heads, 2014. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GU2avVIHde8&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
5 Conrad Black, “Obama’s ISIS Strategy Is Weak,” National Review Online, September 14, 2014, 
accessed on March 3, 2015. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/387961/obamas-isis-strategy-weak-
conrad-black. 
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defeating Daesh; instead, it only serves to polarize domestic politics. In the meanwhile, 
Daesh will persist. It will continue to preach its extreme version of Sunni Islam, recruit 
disenfranchised Muslim youths seeking a purpose in life, and perpetuate worldwide 
violence. While domestic issues will become an inevitable distraction, developing an 
effective strategy to defeat Daesh cannot be thought of as the next administration’s 
problem. This begs the question, “Is the current strategy of United States-led air strikes 
supporting the training and equipping (T&E) of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and moderate 
Syrian opposition forces (MSOF) an effective strategy in ‘degrading and ultimately 
destroying’6 Daesh?”  
While many in the National Capital Region (NCR) believe the current strategy 
will eventually lead to Daesh’s defeat, this study argues that this strategy is not only 
ineffective but actually strengthens Daesh’s strategic position, making it even more 
difficult to defeat. The Daesh problem-set is one the United States has yet to encounter, 
and may therefore require a new, more innovative strategy. 
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
This thesis addresses the Daesh problem-set not from a traditional military 
perspective, but through a social science lens where human dynamics serve as the 
compelling force behind strategy development. It first examines key principles of social 
movement theory (SMT) that drive the motivations and preconditions required of 
mobilization and collective action. It then attempts to map out the Daesh network through 
social media exploitation (SME) and conduct detailed analysis utilizing social network 
analysis (SNA) to illuminate critical actors, relationships, and structural dynamics within 
Daesh. With a more informed understanding of the overall Daesh network, it then applies 
SMT principles in an attempt to influence the caliphate’s population into collective 
action, precipitating Daesh’s implosion. 
                                                 
6 Barack Obama, “President Obama: ‘We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL’” Accessed 
September 17, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we-will-degrade-and-
ultimately-destroy-isil. 
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C. THE PROBLEM 
Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the 
Jordanian insurgent who created Tawhid wa al-Jihad, pledged bayat, or allegiance, to 
Osama bin Laden and became al-Qaeda’s (AQ) official militant organization in Iraq, 
known as al-Qaeda in Iraqi (AQI).7 Al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006 left vacant AQI’s top 
leadership position, allowing Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s to assume the mantle. After 
rebranding AQI into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), it suffered a rash of defeats at the 
hands of Iraqi Sunnis supported by U.S. forces during the 2007 Shawa, or Sunni 
Awakening, forcing ISI to take refuge in Syria.8 Abu Omar’s death in 2010 allowed a 
relatively unknown man, Abu Bakr al-Baghadi, to become the next emir, or leader, of 
ISI.9 Under his leadership in Syria, free from American targeting and masked by the 
chaos of the Syrian civil war, ISI broke ties with al-Qaeda and established itself as the 
preeminent jihadi organization,10 changing its name again to the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS). It then embarked on a deliberate campaign to weaken the Iraqi Sunni 
population that sided with American forces and the Government of Iraq (GOI) through 
systematic attacks on state infrastructure, such as prison systems, law enforcement, and 
judicial personnel.11 The 2014 invasion and subsequent takeover of Mosul, Iraq, proved 
to be the catalyst needed for al-Baghdadi to formally announce the caliphate, with al-
Baghdadi serving as the caliph, and ultimately declaring it the Islamic State.12 
                                                 
7 “What Is Islamic State?” BBC News, September 26, 2014, accessed on December 18, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.   
8 Jessica D. Lewis, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent,” Institute for the Study of War, September 2013. 
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgent. 
9 Graeme Baker, “The Fierce Ambition of ISIL’s Baghdadi,” Al Jazeera, June 15, 2014, accessed on 
February 26, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/fierce-ambition-isil-baghdadi-
2014612142242188464.html. 
10 Raed Omari, “ISIS: Rapid Transformation from Militia to State,” Al Arabiya English, July 27, 
2014, accessed on February 25, 2015. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-
east/2014/07/27/ISIS-Rapid-transformation-from-militia-to-state.html.  
11 Craig Whiteside, “War, Interrupted, Part I: The Roots of the Jihadist Resurgence in Iraq,” War on 
the Rocks, November 5, 2014, accessed on February 26, 2015. http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/war-
interrupted-part-i-the-roots-of-the-jihadist-resurgence-in-iraq/. 
12 “What Is Islamic State?” BBC News. 
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1. Current U.S. Strategy 
The current U.S. strategy to combat Daesh, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, 
rests on the shoulders of special operations forces (SOF), aviators from around the world, 
and a strong international coalition.13 SOF advisors are not in direct combat roles, but 
rather train and equip ISF, Kurdish forces, and MSOF in traditional and urban warfare in 
the hopes of building war-fighting capabilities to oust Daesh from its Iraqi and Syrian 
strongholds. Aviators conduct daily air strikes targeting Daesh ground forces, as reported 
by the U.S Central Command (CENTCOM) homepage14—providing a “body-count-like” 
metric with which to measure progress. The international coalition provides limited air 
support, personnel, equipment, humanitarian aid, and funding.15 Altogether, more than 60 
nations spanning regional borders and religious boundaries are working in concert to 
degrade and ultimately destroy Daesh. 
2. Reanalyzing the Problem through an Alternative Framework 




The United States’ excellence in conventional warfare is widely accepted. Its 
power projection capabilities and successful implementation of maneuver warfare have 
been witnessed throughout the world, as demonstrated by the United States’ swift 
victories in Grenada’s Operation URGENT FURY in 1983, Iraq’s Operation DESERT 
STORM in 1991, the Taliban defeat during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, 
and Baghdad’s capture during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. Where the United 
States excels in conventional warfare, it falters in alternative forms of warfare—
                                                 
13 Tanya Somanader, “5 Things to Know: The President Lays Out the U.S. Plan to Degrade and 
Destroy ISIL,” The White House, September 17, 2014, accessed on February 26, 2015. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/17/president-lays-out-us-plan-degrade-and-destroy-isil.  
14 United States Central Command, accessed February 26, 2015. http://www.centcom.mil/.  
15 Colin Freeman, “Who Is in the Anti-Islamic State Coalition and What They Are Contributing?” The 




counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM post 2004 serve 
as examples. While some may point to the U.S. victory in the Cold War as a success in 
alternative forms of warfare, recent events in Georgia, Crimea, and the Ukraine suggest 
the Cold War may never have truly ended. The U.S. Army recognizes this deficiency and 
has restructured its Army Operating Concept to better address warfare in the 21st 
century.16 This conceptual force restructuring, however, is still years from becoming 
operational. In the meantime, the current dilemma involving Daesh represents an 
opportunity for the United States to utilize its current force structure to execute an 
alternative form of warfare, that of Irregular Warfare (IW). 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis is predicated on three assumptions. First, a full-scale military invasion 
against Daesh is neither advisable nor plausible. In the wake of two significant wars in 
which the United States spent vast amounts of treasure and blood, U.S. popular support 
of another large-scale, protracted conflict is low. Economically, the United States does 
not have the financial resources required to sustain a wholesale military effort to quell 
Daesh. Furthermore, as seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan, nation-building is too time-
consuming and cost-prohibitive to defeat Daesh then rebuild Iraq and Syria into viable 
governing states.17  
It is reasonable to assume that Daesh is not internally homogeneous and that there 
is discontent within its territorial control.18 When Daesh declared its caliphate in late June 
2014, there were factions throughout the Muslim world that did not accept it. 
Additionally, Daesh’s brutal controlling tactics have alienated swathes of Iraqis and 
Syrians, creating a fragile state held together through repression and violence. It appears 
Daesh’s premature caliphate declaration has created a number of potential anti-Daesh 
groups, or fissures, throughout the region. 
                                                 
16 Chapter III discusses the new Army Operating Concept in detail.  
17  Micah Zenko,  “The Slippery Slope of U.S. Intervention,” Foreign Policy, August 11, 2014. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/11/the_slippery_slope_of_us_intervention_iraq_islamic_sta
te_humanitarian_intervention. 
18 Robert S. Ford, “The Fractured Caliphate,” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2014. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/07/the_fractured_caliphate_isis_iraq_sunni_awakening. 
 6
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that Daesh is composed of multiple 
subnetworks, whereby natural fissures likely exist between those subnetworks. In 
identifying these fissures and, more importantly, the influential individuals within them, 
the United States can set conditions within the caliphate through alternative warfare 
techniques rather than traditional warfare methods to bring about Daesh’s demise. Much 
like the Sunni Awakening of 2007, disenfranchised groups can play an influential role in 
shaping the environment if properly leveraged,19 thus aiding in Daesh’s defeat.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Whether Daesh represents an existential threat to the United States or not, a 
functioning Daesh continues to upset a region that plays a dominate role in geopolitics; 
the threat must be addressed. In light of the current fiscal environment and in the wake of 
two protracted wars that have weakened America’s appetite for yet another, alternative 
means to combat Daesh must be considered. This leads to the question: what alternative 
methods, those currently being employted, are available to the United States to degrade 
and ultimately destroy Daesh? 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The Daesh problem-set remains a fluid topic where daily events impact data 
collection, requiring constant reevaluation of the methodology. To mitigate this, the 
research and data collected is bounded from roughly 2001, the inception of mainstream 
Al Qaeda, to March 2015. To explore alternative means in combating Daesh, the Daesh 
problem set is analyzed through an IW and social network analysis (SNA) framework 
and a social movement theory (SMT) lens. This thesis is inductive in nature and its major 
goals are: 
 Identify Daesh membership through social media exploitation, open 
source databases, mainstream media feeds, and intellectual think tanks. 
                                                 
19  Andrew Phillips, “How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 
(March 2009): 64–84. 
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 Map out Daesh’s structural network and use SNA to analyze the network 
in order to find key the influencers and relationships driving Daesh 
operations. 
 Apply principles of SMT to the network in an effort to develop alternative 
means to combat Daesh. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
Chapter I provides an introduction to the Daesh problem set, outlines the genesis 
of Daesh, the analytical framework, thesis assumptions, and the methodology. Chapter II 
reviews the literature of social network analysis and social movement theory. It discusses 
the significance of leadership, brokerage, and network composition and concludes with 
outlining IW. Chapter III details the significance of human domain mapping and how it 
supports the U.S. Army’s new Army Operating Concept, ARSOF 2022, and a social 
movement theory approach to unconventional warfare – the foundation of this thesis’ 
recommended strategy. Chapter IV discusses the collected data, analytics, and critical 
components of Daesh’s network. Chapter V offers conceptual strategies, using principles 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 
Social network analysis (SNA) and social movement theory (SMT) make up the 
principle academic arenas utilized in this research. SNA provides the analytic framework 
to obtain a better understanding of the Daesh network while principles of SMT are 
utilized to develop concepts of network strategy and alternative options to combat Daesh. 
The literature review begins with a discussion of mobilizing structures and networks, the 
overarching framework used to analyze Daesh. Within this overall framework, the 
literature review covers leadership, brokerage and connective tissues, and operational 
cells. Figure 1 represents a graphical model of the analytical framework utilized 
throughout this research. 
 
Figure 1.  Daesh’s Mobilizing Structures  
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A. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND NETWORKS 
The arguments as to why organization occurs and the most effective form of 
organization are vast. Sidney Tarrow argues that semi-independent local groups that are 
tied together through connective structures generate the most effective forms of 
organization.20 Tarrow’s analysis combines the three different aspects of movement 
organization—formal hierarchical organization, ad hoc organization, and organization 
through connective structures. This section briefly discusses each aspect, providing a 
better understanding of Daesh’s operational cells and its supporting ties. 
The three aspects of organization Tarrow outlines refer to how a movement 
develops. First is the formal hierarchical organization. As cited by Tarrow, Zald and 
McCarthy describe this as an organization with a predefined set of goals and then 
organizes its movement to accomplish these goals.21 This is akin to an entrepreneur 
attempting to secure its own niche within an established industry, developing a business 
plan with associated goals, and creating its business around that plan. The structure is 
formal, with little room for flexibility, and its success depends on the business plan’s 
strength and the chosen leadership to implement the plan. 
Both Gould and McAdam, as cited by Tarrow, explain that the second 
organizational form is a result of happenstance, where collective action occurs after the 
movement makes contact with opponents, causing the movement to manifest out of 
necessity.22 A contemporary example of this organizational form is that of the African 
American community in Ferguson, MO, following the shooting death of Michael Brown. 
Prior to Brown’s death, there was no formal organization to initiate collective action with 
the intent of social change. The tragic death of one of its community members served as 
the catalyst that spurred collective action. 
The final organizational form Tarrow describes is that of connective structures. 
Citing Dani, Tarrow explains that it is only when a movement internalizes its significant 
                                                 
20 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 124. 
21 Ibid., 123. 
22 Ibid., 123–124. 
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ties, linking together every aspect of the movement—leader to follower, center to 
periphery, and various supporting social groups—that a movement coalesces into a 
unified organization.23 The movement’s leadership can mobilize the base during times of 
need, then allow the movement to fall into abeyance structures—or temporarily inactive 
structures—following the required collective action.24 This combination of semi-formal 
hierarchy with decentralized support offers a more flexible organizational form with a 
unifying leadership capable of ensuring the movement’s longevity. 
Tarrow concludes that there is no single model for successful organization. 
Formal hierarchical movement organizations offer a permanent leadership structure 
capable of internalizing its base, but offer little flexibility in its ability to disrupt. 
Conversely, decentralized autonomy may succeed in the heat of the moment, but lacks 
the necessary leadership and infrastructure required to sustain a movement. Therefore, 
movement organizers must find a reasonable balance between the two. Central to each, 
however, are the informal ties that link a movement’s formal and informal components. 
This connective structure gives a movement the strength needed for sustainment while 
simultaneously providing a form of hierarchy that leadership needs to control the 
movement.25 To disrupt Daesh, it is important to identify its connective structures to 
better understand how it is organized, how it operates, and most importantly its critical 
ties. 
1. Ties 
Successful collective action requires support from across a society, which is 
generated from both horizontal and vertical ties. A tie is defined as “a relation between 
two actors. A tie can be either directed or undirected.”26 Horizontal ties establish a 
movement’s base at a society’s grassroots level. As that base expands, it can generate 
momentum to propel the movement forward. In this thesis, horizontal ties are defined as 
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those ties between groups or individuals within the same social class of a society. Middle 
class groups, which include, but are not limited to, blue collar workers, teachers, and civil 
servants, are considered to be within the same social class, while upper class groups, such 
as political elites, business executives, and senior religious leaders, are considered to be 
in a different, higher social class. Alternatively, vertical ties can provide a movement its 
legitimacy by linking the movement’s base of lower and middle classes to respected 
elites within the higher classes, thus elevating the movement’s stature. Completing this 
conceptual framework strengthens the overall network, makes it more resistant to 
opposition, and increases the probability of successful collective action. 
Ties can be further categorized as weak and strong. Tie strength is considered to 
be scalable but can be difficult to define. With respect to individuals, strong ties can be 
seen as “those [ties] where actors have repeated and relatively intense interactions with 
one another.”27 Conversely, weak ties are “those [ties] where actors see one another 
occasionally or rarely.”28 To further complicate this topic, the strength of a tie can vary 
with time. This is best demonstrated in a contemporary U.S. military profession. Two 
individuals may work together on daily basis within the same unit for years, developing a 
strong tie. Upon the tour’s conclusion, the two are likely to conduct a permanent change 
of station and move on to different assignments at different duty stations. This may cause 
the strong tie to diminish into a weak tie should they maintain sporadic contact or, should 
they never contact each other again, sever the tie altogether.   
Granovetter’s study of weak ties highlights their importance in linking different 
groups to one another within an institutional or organizational setting.29 He argues that 
while not all weak ties are bridges, all bridges are in fact weak ties. It is these bridges that 
link previously unlinked groups and help expand networks. Thus, increasing the number 
of bridges within a network can provide the aforementioned momentum needed to propel 
the movement forward. This is not to suggest that strong ties are of no use. Krackhardt, 
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for instance, argues that trust is built through strong ties and provides a sense of security 
during unsecure times, thus making an organization or institution more resilient.30 This 
trust factor relating to strong ties can support the legitimacy required of a movement to 
succeed. Building on these perspectives, Burt argues that although most bridges are weak 
ties, strong ties can also serve as bridges. He contends that if a tie, regardless of strength, 
spans a space between two groups (i.e., a structural hole), it is a bridge.31 This bridging 
construct can help explain how Daesh was able to withstand the combined U.S./Sunni 
onslaught in 2007, persevere, and rebuild into an organization whose reemergence 
overpowered Iraqi and Syrian forces in 2014.  
The importance of both strong and weak ties is apparent in the structural analysis 
of Daesh. In its attempt to unite Muslims under the caliphate, Daesh understands, likely 
through intuition rather than formal social network analysis, that its strong ties within its 
core are critical in maintaining a cohesive organization while both weak and strong ties 
help grow the organization through brokerage. Pressures from the United States and the 
international coalition intend to stress Daesh beyond its coping capacity, leading to a 
breakdown of its structural ties and its ultimate destruction. Whether intentional or 
coincidental, Daesh’s ties are allowing it to persevere through this unsecure time.  
Daesh’s horizontal and vertical ties, both strong and weak, make up the 
connective structure that provides Daesh with the formal hierarchy needed to sustain its 
movement while offering enough flexibility to adjust its operations at the grassroots 
level. With a better understanding of ties and their relevance in network dynamics, the 
analysis now takes a top-down approach, beginning with leadership. 
B. LEADERSHIP: VERTICAL STRONG TIES 
To identify individuals capable of leading a movement against Daesh, one must 
first qualify Daesh’s leadership to better understand how the organization is run. This 
section begins by outlining Max Weber’s framework of legitimate authority followed by 
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how Daesh’s authority falls within that framework. Next, it discusses leadership capital 
followed by a brief discussion on al-Baghdadi’s own leadership capital. The section 
concludes with a discussion on clientelism and how it relates to Daesh leadership. 
1. Weber’s Framework 
Discussing the conceptual framework of authority will allow a better 
understanding of how Daesh derives its authority, thus helping to identify the qualities 
needed in leadership that can potentially undermine Daesh. Max Weber identified and 
elaborates on the three pure types of legitimate authority that exist within an organization 
or society: rational, traditional, and charismatic.32 Rational, or legal, authority is founded 
on the concept of codified rules and regulations, as prescribed by an accepted group of 
leaders, imposed on a set of people who in turn willingly adhere to the rules.33 The world 
has been witness to the formality from the Romans to the democratic governments of 
today. An authority is deemed traditional when the obedience of a people is not to a 
codified set of rules, but rather to a leader whose authorities have been handed down 
from the past in a sacrosanct manner because “that’s the way it’s always been.”34 
Examples of this are gerontocracy, where the authority rests with a group of elders, as 
with Native American tribes; patriarchalism, where authority rests with a particular man 
through inheritance, as in a household; and patrimonialism, where a leader uses purely 
personal administrative staff to achieve absolute authority over a ruled people, such as 
sultans of Egyptian past.35 Finally, according to Weber, charismatic authority is often 
seen as the antithesis of both rational and traditional authority, which are both perceived 
as common. Charismatic authority is viewed as beyond the routine of everyday authority. 
Charismatic authority is recognized as a leader whose virtue separates him from the 
mundane, is revered as one with other worldly powers or qualities, and therefore requires  
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 15
undying devotion and obedience.36 Contemporary examples of charismatic authority are 
the Branch Davidian’s David Koresh and Jim Jones of the People’s Temple. An authority 
may implement a combination of Weber’s construct to legitimize its own authority, as is 
the case with Daesh.  
2. Daesh Authority within Weber’s Framework 
Whether intentional or coincidental, Daesh implements aspects from all three of 
Weber’s forms of authority in its attempt to legitimize its authority over the Muslim 
world, or Ummah. To justify its rational authority, Daesh implements the codified Sharia 
law directly from the Quran and fatwas, or Islamic legal decree,37 from Islam’s two most 
venerated hadiths,38 written records of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, and a primary 
source for religious law and moral guidance.39 The Ummah, therefore, is obligated to 
adhere to its rules and regulations with Daesh as the enforcing authority. Legitimizing its 
traditional authority, Daesh compares al-Baghdadi’s current struggle to that of the Millat, 
or path, of Ibrahim,40 Allah’s choice to introduce monotheism, more specifically, Islam, 
to mankind.41 This concept is outlined in detail in Daesh’s first monthly propaganda 
periodical, Dabiq, whereby Allah chooses Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to bring the true version 
of Islam back to the world, much like Ibrahim of Islamic lore, with the Islamic State as 
his vehicle.42 The justification for Daesh’s charismatic authority rests solely with al-
Baghdadi. While he may not be touted as one with other worldly powers, al-Baghdadi is 
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an alleged member of the al-Bu Badri tribe from Iraq’s Diyala province, a tribe 
historically known for being descendants of the Prophet Muhammad,43 thus providing 
him qualities beyond that of the common man. This tribal lineage is a critical requirement 
for anyone declaring himself caliph, leader of all Muslims. Equating al-Baghdadi to the 
Prophet Mohammad, the most revered figure in Islam second only to Allah, immediately 
elevates al-Baghdadi’s status to that of prophet, an unattainable attribute for the common 
man. Following this logic, then, al-Baghdadi supporters have granted him their undying 
devotion and obedience. Shrouding its argument for legitimate authority in Weber’s 
framework strengthens Daesh’s claims to ruling the Ummah with al-Baghdadi as its 
caliph. 
Understanding how Daesh has woven its perceived legitimate authority around 
Weber’s framework highlights the difficult task of identifying individuals who may lead 
a countermovement against Daesh. Such individuals must not only possess the same 
qualities that rival Daesh’s rational, traditional, and charismatic forms of authority, but 
they must also overpower these forms of authority such that oppositional support is 
willing to risk everything to actively resist Daesh. To do so, these individuals must 
possess leadership capital rooted in Weber’s forms of legitimate authority.  
3. Leadership Capital  
Nepstad and Bob hypothesize that leaders possessing the three components of 
leadership capital, those of cultural, social, and symbolic capital, have a higher likelihood 
of mobilizing pre-existing organizations when the time is right.44 Cultural capital allows 
leaders to better connect with a movement’s base through their grassroots understanding 
of local customs, values, language, and overall way of life.45 This provides leaders with a 
sense of homegrown credibility that cannot be manufactured by external forces. Social 
capital refers to the amount and strength of ties a leader has throughout society, where 
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“weak ties” refer to broader relationships spanning a society and “strong ties” refer to 
reoccurring personal contacts, strong social relations, and mutually shared social 
locations.46 These ties provide the necessary influences required of a leader to chair a 
movement. Finally, symbolic capital refers to the “prestige, honor, and social 
recognition” of individuals, thus epitomizing the movement.47 Historical figures that best 
exemplify symbolic capital, and in fact leadership capital, are Nelson Mandela, George 
Washington, and Ghandi. Al-Baghdadi’s own leadership capital is fabricated, at best, in 
order to build his own credibility and, ostensibly, Daesh’s.  
4. Daesh’s Leadership Capital 
Daesh’s propaganda wing has spent an extensive amount of time and effort to 
build al-Baghdadi’s leadership capital and, as a corollary, the legitimacy of Daesh. To 
start, an unidentified author released the “official biography” of al-Baghdadi on jihadi 
websites in August 2014,48 likely in support of al-Baghdadi’s caliphate announcement the 
month prior. This editorial delves into every aspect of al-Baghdadi’s life, attempting to 
build his social, cultural, and symbolic capital. It seeks to validate his piousness, his 
academic prowess in Islamic jurisprudence, his bravery on the jihadi battlefield, his 
devotion to family, and most importantly, justify him as the successor to the Islamic State 
of Iraq, a previous name of Daesh. Daesh followers believe, then, if al-Baghdadi is in fact 
the legitimate caliph, his organization is therefore legitimate. While this post hoc fallacy 
may resonate among the disenfranchised youth targeted for jihad, it also offers an 
exploitable opening in Daesh narrative, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter V. 
5. Clientelism 
Auyero, Lapenga, and Poma discuss the importance of vertical tie concepts, 
through clientelism, or patronage politics. Clientelism is a quid pro quo construct in 
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which key authoritative figures promise resources to those that pledge political support.49 
Auyero et al. outline four scenarios where clientelism may spur collective action.50 The 
first is supporting a threatened key actor, where the key actor turns to constituents for 
backing or assistance should adversaries threaten the actor or actor’s position. The second 
involves turning on a key actor, where the key actor does not uphold his or her end of a 
clientelist bargain and constituents no longer support the key actor. The third scenario 
involves key actor overt instigation, where the loss of support evolves into actively 
resisting the key actor. The final scenario involves key actor covert/clandestine 
instigation, where constituents’ active resistance against a key actor becomes subversion 
or sabotage unbeknownst to the key actor. However, it may occur, successful collective 
action is dependent on key actors, typically those within the political elite, to play a 
significant role in the movement.  
6. Clientelism within Daesh 
This concept can be applied to Daesh and examined in two ways. First, Daesh 
implements, almost forces, clientelism to generate support for its movement and the 
caliphate’s expansion. While some are truly enamored with Daesh ideals, there are 
examples that might suggest otherwise where individuals’ support appears to be 
coerced.51 Second, this forced coercion will likely prove to be Daesh’s demise; its 
citizens will eventually expect a return on investment. Daesh’s capacity to provide basic 
societal needs, such as clean water, electricity, and waste disposal to name a few, is likely 
to wane as the United States continues to degrade Daesh. In this case, the United States 
can destroy the “balance of reciprocity,”52 resulting in collective action. As a precursor, 
the United States can introduce the idea of collective action through social media outlets 
by conducting a persistent information operations campaign targeting Daesh citizens. 
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Sowing the seeds of civil unrest by highlighting its failed clientelist atmosphere can 
foster an insurgency in an attempt undermine Daesh.53 Chapter V discusses this in detail. 
C. BROKERAGE AND CONNECTIVE TISSUES:  HORIZONTAL WEAK 
TIES 
Brokerage is an instrumental concept in understanding the formation of an 
insurgency consisting of bridges and brokers. A bridge is a tie that connects different 
groups within a social network. A broker is an individual that sits on either side of that 
bridge. Brokerage, therefore, is facilitating the transfer of goods, resources, or 
information between the two groups.54 SMT literature suggests three critical components 
of brokerage that are required for its success: the right actor to serve as a broker, the right 
medium to support brokerage, and continuous analysis of the network’s structure. This 
concept can be viewed from the perspective of a burgeoning network struggling to 
survive or an adversary attempting to dismantle an already established network. 
Whatever perspective one takes, the principles of brokerage are the same; it all depends 
on which side the broker supports. Taking it one step further, it is not the presence of 
brokers that solidify a network, but the effectiveness of said brokers. Without the right 
people in place—those who exhibit the right traits, personalities, and characteristics—
connected to the right components of a society, networks are doomed to remain stagnant 
at best or, at worst, completely fall apart. Therefore, conditions must be set in order to 
promote a broker’s success.  
The first component of brokerage is finding the “right guy.” Gould discusses the 
importance of unbiased, network-focused, non-resourced based brokerage in the 
successful development of a network.55 Brokers who derive their influence from resource 
incentives are automatically biased and, therefore, untrustworthy. An example of a very 
successful broker is Paul Revere during the American Revolution. Han demonstrates how 
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Paul Revere was able to seamlessly interact with the different social groups throughout 
Boston’s society.56 His charismatic qualities afforded him likeability, and his personal 
traits and education gave him the power of connection. His bridging and brokering 
potential was reached when the call was made for the Revolution. Therefore, influencers 
within a society must be those that can transcend social boundaries with characteristics 
that allow them to connect with leaders within different groups. Whether it is for rallying 
purposes or information dissemination, finding individuals who can bridge the gap 
between different social groups is an important factor in influencing operations. 
The second component to successful brokerage is the correct medium in which a 
broker operates. In a more contemporary example of brokerage, Harris discusses Iran’s 
Green Movement of 2009 where its leaders attempted to use a less restricted internet to 
organize and coordinate the movement’s operations. The internet allowed brokers to 
reach more supporters but failed to fully unite the movement as a whole. Face-to-face 
communication proved to be the most effective organizing tool, while an increased 
reliance on electronic communication actually caused organization to wane.57  Whether 
these outcomes are a result of an inexperienced society with internet communications or a 
lack of faith in its reliability, it does demonstrate the importance of the choosing the 
correct medium for brokerage.  
The final component is the continuous analysis of the network in which the broker 
operates. In Clarke’s 2011 article covering brokerage in Egypt’s Arab Spring, he warns 
of relying too heavily on a network’s structure to determine brokerage potential.58 He 
found that prior to the movement, actors within the network appeared more or less central 
to Egyptian society, yet they evolved into more or less central actors within the 
movement. In other words, the situation on the ground drastically changed such that 
actors with previously no ties later formed ties that proved critical to the movement and 
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vice versa. The movement was forced to adjust its brokerage roles to encompass the 
newly acquired ties and distance itself from former supporters who turned on the 
movement. Egypt’s Arab Spring demonstrates the necessity for continuous structural 
analysis, forcing network developers to constantly adjust brokerage roles to extract the 
most utility from a supportive society. 
Understanding the three components of brokerage is critical when developing 
strategies aimed at dismantling a network. It allows a strategist to identify key links, or 
connective tissues, that form a network’s structural foundation. Much like demolishing a 
building, attacking the critical links within a network’s foundational structure is the most 
efficient means in which to bring it down. By understanding who makes up the critical 
links (brokers), in what modus they operate (medium), and continuous analysis of the 
constantly evolving network, strategist are then able to focus their dismantling efforts on 
those nodes responsible for holding the network together. The resulting strategy, in 
effect, will cause the network to implode on itself. 
D. OPERATIONAL CELLS: HORIZONTAL STRONG TIES 
Daesh set conditions for its return to Iraq by eliminating oppositional horizontal 
ties throughout the country. As early as 2009, Daesh systematically targeted Government 
of Iraq (GOI) employees responsible for local governance.59 In doing so, it successfully 
eliminated future resistance and ensured its supporters, or at least those who would not 
actively oppose Daesh, filled those newly vacated positions. In a sense, the elimination of 
oppositional horizontal ties supported Daesh’s near unchallenged return to Iraq.   
In the same vein, in a post-caliphate declaration Daesh targeted Sunni Awakening 
tribes who sided with American forces in 2007, most notably western Anbar’s Al Bu 
Nimr tribe.60 Daesh’s massacre of the Al Bu Nimr tribe sent a message throughout the 
Sunni world that any anti-Daesh people, be it Sunni or Shia, were considered enemies 
                                                 
59 Craig Whiteside, “War, Interrupted, Part I: The Roots of the Jihadist Resurgence in Iraq,” War on 
the Rocks, November 5, 2014, accessed on March 17, 2015. http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/war-
interrupted-part-i-the-roots-of-the-jihadist-resurgence-in-iraq/.  
60 Orla Guerin, “Iraq: Sunni Tribe ‘Left for Slaughter’ by Islamic State,” BBC News, November 10, 
2014, accessed on March 17, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29984668.  
 22
and therefore destined for death. This process eliminated the opposition’s horizontal 
strong ties while simultaneous building its own supportive horizontal strong ties 
throughout the Sunni community. Whether Sunni tribes had foreknowledge of Daesh’s 
attack on the Al Bu Nimr tribe or not, months prior to the massacre, leaders from 23 Iraqi 
and Syrian Sunni tribes traveled to Amman, Jordan to announce their bayat, or 
allegiance, to Daesh. In all likelihood, these tribes were hedging their bets by siding with 
whom they presumed to be the eventual winning side and not necessarily full subscribers 
to Daesh’s ideology.61 Regardless of intentions, their pledges of bayat provided Daesh 
with critical connective tissues, a plethora of horizontal strong ties, it needed to succeed 
in its territorial takeover. 
Internally, the vast majority of Daesh’s senior leadership and al-Baghdadi’s 
closest confidants are Iraqi nationals.62 This in and of itself represents horizontal strong 
ties within Daesh. Much like foreign nationals immigrating to another country, the 
majority inevitably resides within the same community to aid in assimilation and ease the 
burden of learning to live amongst an entirely new culture. Following the psychological 
principle of similarity, likeminded people tend to gravitate towards each other, providing 
a sense of security and trust throughout the community. Examples of this phenomenon 
are Arabs in Dearborn, MI, and Chinese in San Francisco’s Chinatown. Daesh, 
specifically al-Baghdadi, used his time in Camp Bucca to recruit likeminded, trusted 
Iraqis into his inner fold,63 placing some in senior caliphate positions and others at 
wilaya, or provincial, positions. Al-Baghdadi established horizontal strong ties in Camp 
Bucca to create an Iraqi community founded on a common ideology, Salafism, and a 
common way of life, jihad. This built Daesh’s core and resonated outwards towards the 
operational cells at the periphery.  
The final example of Daesh’s horizontal strong ties is found within operational 
cells at the periphery, specifically among the ranks of foreign fighters. Daesh’s takeover 
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caused a mass exodus of both Syrian and Iraqi nationals seeking refuge from Daesh’s 
violent regime. This lack of a labor supply is just one reason Daesh employed foreign 
fighters in operational cells tasked with controlling the caliphate. The most visible 
example is that of the Hisbah, the morality policy charged with enforcing the Sharia. 
Syrians that have successfully fled the caliphate report that the Hisbah, and foreign 
fighters in general, are more determined fighters, earn better salaries, are harder to 
corrupt, generally have more military experience and technical expertise, and are the 
most feared.64 This combination contributes to foreign fighters as a whole experiencing 
an elevated status. By default, they then share a more prestigious status form horizontal 
strong ties within their own community. Therefore, the previously mentioned concept of 
foreigners sticking together in foreign lands holds true in the caliphate as well. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Social network analysis (SNA) and social movement theory (SMT) literature 
provided a foundation for obtaining a better understanding of the Daesh network. The 
literature review discussed Daesh’s mobilizing structures and network and provided a 
detailed examination of leadership, brokerage and connective tissues, and operational 
cells. This framework will be used in Chapter IV to discuss the Daesh network and 
provided critical analysis to support an alternative method to combat Daesh. Chapter III 
explores the realm of human domain mapping and discusses how it not only supports, but 
also enhances the United States’ ability to conduct combat operations in 21st century 
warfare and ultimately the fight against Daesh. 
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III. MAPPING THE HUMAN DOMAIN 
Physical terrain maps are vital to the U.S. military in planning, coordinating, 
navigating, and executing operations. These “graphic representation[s] of a portion of the 
earth’s surface drawn to scale, as seen from above,”65 provide a common operating 
picture for the most senior commander down to the lowest ranking soldier. Combat in the 
21st century, however, involves not only geographical terrain but also the human domain 
to a larger, and arguably more important, extent. Therefore, human domain maps are just 
as critical to 21st century warfare as terrestrial maps. This chapter demonstrates the 
importance of these human domain maps. It first discusses the new Army Operating 
Concept (AOC) followed by a discussion on the future of Army Special Operations 
Forces (ARSOF) as outlined in ARSOF 2022. Next, it outlines how human domain 
mapping supports the new AOC and ARSOF 2022 in relation to developing foreign 
policy strategies. The chapter concludes by discussing a social movement theory (SMT) 
approach to unconventional warfare (UW), the basis for this thesis’ recommended 
strategy, in which understanding the human domain is absolutely imperative.  
A. THE NEW ARMY OPERATING CONCEPT 
The Department of Defense (DOD) recently charged the U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with overhauling the AOC to reflect 21st century 
warfare. TRADOC’s transition from “Air Land Battle,” the current AOC, to “Winning in 
a Complex World,” is more than just a doctrinal change; it is a mindset change that 
begins with pre-war, or in contemporary joint parlance, Phase 0 activities. This section 
discusses these activities and how the AOC intends to accomplish this task. First, the 
section discusses the four continuities of war, followed by the AOC improving on the 
current operational preparation of the environment (OPE) to intellectual and operational 
preparation of the environment (IOPE). The section concludes by examining how special 
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operations forces can accomplish IOPE and how human domain mapping can facilitate its 
mission. 
The new AOC is predicated on four continuities of war:  war is an extension of 
politics, a contest of wills between adversaries, a human endeavor, and uncertain.66 These 
Clausewitzian continuities highlight the need to master an operational environment’s 
(OE) human dynamics pre-hostilities, so they can then be shaped and manipulated during 
the conflict in order to set conditions that best support U.S. strategic objectives post 
hostilities. To fight a 21st century war in an environment that is dynamic and uncertain,67 
the side that can more accurately anticipate the unknowable will have a marked 
advantage. Much like fighting a terrain-based war in which map reconnaissance can 
provide crucial information regarding future battles, war fought within the human and 
political domain requires its own “map” reconnaissance. Unfortunately, human domain 
maps are not nearly as prevalent in intelligence shops as physical terrain maps. Like 
cartographers of old, modern day human domain cartographers are needed to develop 
human domain maps for 21st century warfare. Human domain maps will provide the 
initial understanding of human dynamics and help maintain that understanding 
throughout the conflict and beyond. 
The new AOC relies on IOPE, the process to preset a theater of operations and 
provide future operational forces maximum understanding of the OE prior to committing 
forces.68 To accomplish this, the AOC can rely on regionally aligned special operations 
forces (SOF) to ensure maximum situational understanding across land, air, sea, space, 
and cyber domains by fusing and disseminating information within the combined and 
joint arena. Humans are the focal point of this fusion construct, requiring an intimate 
understanding of the people driving the operating environment.  
                                                 
66 Department of the Army, 2014, The U.S. Army Operating Concept (TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3-1), 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
67 Ibid., iii.  
68 Ibid., iv. 
 27
B. THE FUTURE OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
In early 2013, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
commander Lieutenant General (LTG) Charles T. Cleveland released his vision for the 
future of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) in ARSOF 2022. It highlights the 
ambiguity of 21st century warfare and lays out the blueprint to “enable ARSOF to thrive 
in a future operating environment that is characterized by uncertainty.”69 Nesting his 
vision with the new AOC, LTG Cleveland laid the groundwork to combat this uncertainty 
through two critical capabilities—surgical strike and special warfare. This section will 
outline those two critical capabilities, briefly discuss their integral components, and 
demonstrate how they fit into the new AOC.  
ARSOF 2022 divides the future of ARSOF into two critical capabilities, surgical 
strike and special warfare. They are defined as: 
 Surgical Strike:  The execution of activities in a precise manner that 
employ SOF in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to 
seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or 
influence threats.  
 Special Warfare: The execution of activities that involve a combination 
of lethal and non-lethal actions taken by specially trained and educated 
forces that have a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, 
proficiency in small-unit tactics, subversion, sabotage and the ability to 
build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, 
uncertain or hostile environment. 70 
By their definitions alone, it is clear each capability represents a very different 
approach in prosecuting uncertainty; surgical strike takes a direct, kinetic approach while 
special warfare takes a more indirect approach through partnerships. The intent is to 
produce mutually supporting SOF elements capable of executing a multitude of 
operations across the SOF Core Operations spectrum at the operational and tactical levels 
all focused on common strategic goals.71  
                                                 
69 Department of the Army, 2013, ARSOF 2022, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 3. 
70 Ibid., 10.  
71 Ibid., 10–11.  
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Within the spectrum of surgical strike and special warfare, UW is a special 
warfare operation, while combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) falls under the 
purview of surgical strike (see Figure 2). The remaining SOF Core Operations—Foreign 
Internal Defense, Stability Operations, Counterinsurgency, Support to Major Combat 
Operations (MCO), and Counterterrorism—are accomplished through a combination of 
both critical capabilities, with some relying more heavily on surgical strike capabilities 
and others more so on special warfare capabilities. This demonstrates the mutual 
dependency of both critical capabilities while highlighting the specific tasks designated to 
each. 
 
Figure 2.  From ARSOF 2022, SOF Core Operations within the spectrum of 
Special Warfare and Surgical Strike72 
USASOC further identifies ARSOF as the force to fight within the AOC’s newly 
coined human domain. As a component of the Army, USASOC is inherently postured to 
conduct operations throughout the land domain. The new AOC has identified, however, 
that the human domain is where future of warfare will be decided. Therefore, the Army 
must have a component capable of operating and succeeding within the human domain. 
USASOC has taken the lead in developing a force capable of operating in this new 
domain (see Figure 3), and LTG Cleveland set his priorities to support such an 
endeavor.73  
                                                 
72 Ibid., 11.  
73 Ibid., 16.  
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Figure 3.  USASOC is the leading proponent for operations  
within the Human Domain74 
LTG Cleveland’s top priority in ARSOF 2022 is investing in human capital, a 
reflection of 21st century warfare. When warfare transitioned from trench warfare to 
maneuver warfare, the U.S. Army invested in weaponry and modified tactics in support 
of the evolution. The concept here is the same. The focus of warfare shifting from the 
land domain to the human domain requires an upgrade of the U.S. arsenal; LTG 
Cleveland’s top priority represents this upgrade, specifically to special warfare. USASOC 
intends to improve upon its human capital development by taking advantage of the wide 
range of ethnicities found in America. The intent is to recruit those who already possess 
native language capabilities and inherent cultural knowledge, train them in the arts of 
special warfare, and build a capacity within USASOC to access regions previously 
thought untenable. This diverse force will have the capability to operate across the broad 
human domain spectrum, providing special warfare an advantage on a scale far beyond 
the Army’s current capabilities.75  
                                                 
74 Ibid., 16. 
75 Ibid., 18–19. 
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C. HUMAN DOMAIN MAPPING IN THE NEW ARMY OPERATING 
CONCEPT 
TRADOC’s new AOC transformation is a monumental task with bold aspirations. 
The concept is logical, yet its practical application has yet to be witnessed. The new AOC 
assumes political and human dynamics ensures 21st century warfare will continue be 
complex and uncertain.76 This suggests a shift in intelligence requirements, from terrain 
analysis and studying the enemy’s composition and disposition to analyzing a society’s 
human dynamics. The two natural assumptions that follow are the need to retool our 
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) prior to hostilities and the need to develop 
a force capable of accomplishing this preparation. This begs the question, how is this to 
be done? The simple answer can be deduced from a rudimentary comparison of an 
infantry company attacking an enemy encampment in the land domain and a 21st century 
warfare operation within the human domain using a traditional IPB practice.  
To plan a raid on an enemy camp within the land domain, an infantry company’s 
first step is to consult a map using OACOK—observation and fields of fire, avenues of 
approach, cover and concealment, obstacles, and key terrain—as an analytical 
framework. Commanders will first identify the enemy’s observation and fields of fire 
within its defenses to help identify which avenues of approach the company should take 
to advance on the enemy encampment. Along those avenues of approach, they will then 
assess the level of cover and concealment based on terrain to help determine what 
formations to use and where to emplace his attacking force and support by fire positions. 
They will then determine potential obstacles that are likely integrated in the enemy’s 
defense, such as mines or concertina wire, and adjust his plan accordingly. Finally, 
attacking commanders will locate any key terrain that will provide his unit a marked 
advantage over the enemy, such as a hilltop overlooking the objective or the only bridge 
crossing a non-fordable river. Only once this process is complete are the commanders 
able to formulate a plan to effectively raid the enemy position while minimizing the risk 
to his unit. This same concept can be applied to conducting operations within the human 
domain. 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 8.  
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To plan an operation within the human domain, operators’ first step is to identify 
the regime’s observation and fields of fire to determine the regime’s level of situational 
awareness throughout the society. They will determine which areas the regime controls, 
such as security forces or governmental agencies, and which areas it does not. This 
“observation” can also include how to use organic access and placement, especially 
around boundaries to “see” who is who in the area of interest. This allows operators to 
determine which individuals and groups to target and which to avoid, or avenues of 
approach, when attempting to infiltrate the network. Next, they determine the level of 
cover and concealment within those groups that offer the best avenues into the network. 
This is as simple as identifying if those groups are politically sensitive for the regime to 
attack or eliminate because they are equally important to both the regime and the 
revolutionaries, resistance, and insurgents (RRI).77 Examples of good cover and 
concealment are religious groups and civil services. The obstacles operators must identify 
are those rules, laws, or conditions that reduce their freedom of movement within the 
targeted society, such as curfews, rewards for reporting dissent to the authorities, or 
secret police like the Iranian Basij. These are critical parts of the targeted society the 
operator must avoid. Finally, operators must identify an aspect within the targeted society 
that provides them a marked advantage over the regime, or key terrain. This can come in 
the form of individuals who bridge seemingly dissimilar groups, marginalized elites with 
grudges against the regime, or religious authorities with the ability to sway popular 
thought. After a thorough analysis of the targeted society based on a well developed and 
current human domain map, the operators can formulate a more informed plan with 
which to infiltrate and eventually influence a targeted society. Refer to Table 1 for a brief 
comparison of land domain IPB and human domain IPB. 
 
 
                                                 
77 David S. Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” Small Wars Journal, 
October 23, 2014. accessed on February 2, 2015. 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CC0QFjAC&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fsmallwarsjournal.com%2Fprintpdf%2F16397&ei=msvkVPb5JIzxoATEx4Aw&usg=AFQjCNE
9sVfNBNvLDFV77z4jK354tmCgMg&bvm=bv.85970519,d.cGU. David Maxwell introduced the term 
RRI. 
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Table 1.   Comparison of land and human domain analysis using traditional 
IPB technique, OACOK 
 
 
This simple comparison using traditional IPB techniques reinforces the 
importance of maps in the land domain and demonstrates the need for similar maps in the 
human domain. Planning operations within the human domain, in which the importance 
of human dynamics outweigh geographical terrain, requires maps that afford operators 
the same degree, but not the same kind, of detail as if they were planning a traditional 
infantry operation. Human domain maps can offer this to 21st century warriors so they 
have the same level of situational awareness within the human domain as traditional 




D. HUMAN DOMAIN MAPPING AND ARSOF 2022 
Unconventional Warfare:  Activities to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 
power through and with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a 
denied area. 
—Joint Pub 1–0278 
The new AOC acknowledges that 21st century warfare requires the full 
integration of conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) to “conduct 
operations of significant scale and duration to accomplish the mission across the range of 
military operations.”79 Unconventional Warfare (UW) is significant to the range of 
military operations with respect to SOF. Retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel 
David Maxwell points out that U.S. policy makers unfortunately lack an intellectual 
foundation of UW, preventing them from effectively implementing a UW strategy into 
national policy.80 This observation makes the aforementioned CF/SOF integration 
difficult, as the SOF Truths correctly surmise that most SOF operations, especially UW, 
require non-SOF support.81 UW cannot be accomplished overnight but rather through 
persistent engagement with regional partners focused on assessing, developing, and 
understanding relationships of influential actors and groups, both friend and foe. This 
requirement is a leading factor in ARSOF 2022’s attempt to enhance ARSOF’s ability in 
this arena, specifically in special warfare. This enhanced capability, supported by human 
domain mapping, can provide a clearer picture of the human dynamics in strategically 
important regions where UW could be the only viable foreign policy option. To 
exemplify this concept, a brief discussion of UW operations is most appropriate.  
                                                 
78 Department of Defense, 2014, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1–02), 
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 263. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.  
79 TRADOC PAM 525–3-1, 25. 
80 David S. Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” Small Wars Journal, 




81 SOF Truths. http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/SOFTruths.html. 
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1. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND HUMAN DOMAIN 
MAPPING 
Human domain mapping is arguably most pertinent to UW as shown in Figure 2. 
FM 3–18, Special Forces Operations, provides the UW operational framework for U.S. 
Army Special Forces (USSF), the proponent for UW. USSF are capable of and tasked 
with: 
 Infiltrating denied territory and linking up with resistance forces 
 Providing training and advisory assistance to the guerrilla or underground 
forces [as] part of a resistance 
 Coordinating and synchronizing the various resistance command elements 
with U.S. efforts.82  
This process is conducted through seven tactical phases—preparation, initial 
contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, employment, and transition. The focus 
throughout is identifying, assessing, vetting, selecting, training, equipping, managing, and 
employing partner forces whose interests support U.S. strategic goals of coercing, 
disrupting, or overthrowing a government or occupying power.83 An implied task, and 
critical throughout this process, is an understanding of the human dynamics within the 
UW operational area (UWOA). This understanding allows USSF to target the appropriate 
forces, establish rapport with the most influential individuals within the targeted forces, 
and maintain those relationships to secure a long-term partnership focused on mutual 
strategic goals. To simplify the difficult task of identifying partner forces with whom to 
build relationships, planners and intelligence officials can implement human domain 
mapping to provide UW practitioners a clearer picture of the UWOA. 
2. ARSOF IPOE IN SUPPORT OF THE NEW AOC 
Returning to the Army’s new IOPE concept, ARSOF is postured, with recognized 
regional relationships and expertise, to develop and operate networks within a well-
established joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) environment. By 
                                                 
82 Department of the Army, 2012, Special Forces Operations (FM 3–18), Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2–5. 
83 Ibid., 2–4—2–8.  
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virtue of their job requirements, ARSOF is the eyes and ears of future commanders. They 
are poised with in depth knowledge of the human environment—beyond just knowing 
names, duty positions, and responsibilities—and can identify who influences whom, 
recognize which relationships drive the operational environment, and most importantly, 
discern how the U.S. can influence those relationships to support U.S. strategic 
objectives. ARSOF’s mapping of the human domain can cogently present this data, 
identify critical inject points within the network, and ultimately provide a more refined 
IPOE product. 
Important to ARSOF, and to the greater intelligence mission, is the continuous 
assessment of revolutionary, resistance, and insurgent (RRI) potential in politically 
untenable regions that maintain strategic U.S. interests,84 implying that an initial RRI 
understanding in these regions exists. This is unfortunately not always true. Where a lack 
of initial understanding may exist, such as in denied territories like Iran, Syria, or parts of 
Iraq, detailed research and analysis of the human domain to develop network maps can 
help fill the void. Beyond classified intelligence reports and daily situational updates, it is 
detailed research and analysis of the human domain focused on relational data that will 
provide policy makers with the knowledge of power players, key influential relations, and 
RRI driving political and societal affairs within a region.  
Building this knowledge base begins with mapping the known human domain. 
This is often accomplished through readily accessible, open source information that may 
be scattered throughout the internet on mainstream media, social media, or think tank 
databases, to name a few locations. Consolidating, coding, and mapping this information 
is twofold. First, it helps build the knowledge base of a society’s inner workings that 
policy makers require for better understanding of regional dynamics. Second, it provides 
a level of situational awareness to operators, most notably UW practitioners, which 
would typically take months of work. As it is often said, knowledge is power. To increase 
power, one must increase knowledge. Increasing knowledge requires more information,  
 
                                                 
84 Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?” 
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generated from detailed research and analysis. As it relates to foreign policy, mapping the 
human domain consolidates a society’s relational data, identifies power players and key 
influencers, and illuminates a society’s inner workings. With such knowledge, policy 
makers will be able to appreciate how alternative foreign policy options, such as UW, can 
provide more power. This power, then, provides policy makers a greater ability to 
influence a region and may prove more beneficial than traditional foreign policy 
measures. Without this understanding, they are quick to resort to those measures that 
often prolong problems rather than eliminate them. In short, human domain mapping 
provides a more thorough understanding of regional dynamics, a critical factor in 
developing foreign policy strategies, thus allowing policy makers to consider alternative 
strategies from a more informed position.  
E. HUMAN DOMAIN MAPPING IN A SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
APPROACH TO UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
This final section examines the social movement theory (SMT) approach to UW, 
which provides a framework for leveraging and coopting existing opposition movements, 
or RRI, to augment a UW campaign supporting U.S. strategic objectives.85 Successfully 
integrating this theory into contemporary UW campaign planning requires a foundational 
understanding of the political and human dynamics within an operational environment. 
Mapping the human domain provides this understanding, as previously detailed. More 
importantly, it helps illuminate those opposition movements with leveraging or coopting 
potential, such as preexisting dissident groups, marginalized elites, or disenfranchised 
youth. 
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Glenn Johnson and Doowan Lee note that the benefits 
of adding a SMT approach to UW are threefold.86 First, it provides a theoretical 
framework as to why RRI occurs. While not every RRI evolves on a predetermined 
                                                 
85 Glenn W. Johnson and Doowan Lee, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to 




86 Ibid.  
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template, there are certain principles that exist in facilitating their successful 
development. Some of these principles include identifying grievances, developing a 
unifying narrative, framing the movement, invoking a sense of community through the 
movement, developing resource mobilization structures, and acting upon political 
opportunities. Having a greater appreciation for these principles within a target region 
provides a deeper understanding of how that society works. Second, it provides a 
pragmatic view of how these RRI sustain themselves within a population. Studying the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of RRI provides a better understanding of 
what works and what fails within a specific society. Those RRI with longevity have 
refined their TTPs to ensure success, or at least to prevent destruction. Replicating 
successful RRI TTPs reduces the likelihood of exposing external sponsorship and 
increases the movement’s probability of success. Lastly, implementing a SMT approach 
to UW helps externally supported RRI campaigns appear ideologically indigenous and 
therefore, legitimate. This prevents potential negative propaganda targeting the sponsor, 
which could cause potential strategic setbacks and the movement’s ultimate destruction. 
A SMT approach to UW offers policy makers alternative foreign policy options beyond 
those of traditional diplomacy and military strikes. To develop these alternative options, 
however, planners must first identify preexisting organic movements prior to any 
engagement within a targeted region. 
Human domain mapping, as it relates to the SMT approach to UW, provides 
policy makers a foundational network within which to visualize and understand 
preexisting opposition movements and leverage points within a targeted society. It 
provides a clearer picture of the overall strategic network by identifying elite fractures, 
societal divides, friendly and threatening subgroups, bridges and brokers, and key 
players. Knowing a society’s inner workings then allows policy makers to identify those 
preexisting RRI whose ideals align with U.S. strategic policy, allowing them to develop 
strategies to influence the key players and relationships that drive those RRI in favor of 
U.S. strategic policies. Policy makers cannot initiate this technique at a conflict’s 
beginning; it must be a continuous process that begins in the steady state, or Phase 0, and 
continues throughout and beyond the conflict. Incorporating human domain mapping in 
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support of the SMT approach to UW supports the Army’s new AOC and the future of 
ARSOF while simultaneously widens the aperture through which policy makers develop 
and implement U.S. strategic policy.    
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IV. DAESH 
A. DAESH’S NETWORK 
Daesh’s overall organization can be characterized as a formal command structure 
and an informal network of brokers and facilitators. At the top of command structure is 
Daesh’s caliph, Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarai, better known as Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi. He is supported by his staff, or councils, and oversees the two regional 
commands of the caliphate, Iraq Regional Command (IRC) and Syria Regional 
Command (SRC). An emir commands each region, which is further divided into 
provinces, or wilayat. A governor commands each wilaya (s.) with his own supporting 
councils. This military-like structure supports localized operations while still making 
available orders and directives from superior commands. Daesh’s mobilizing structure 
provides vertical strong ties throughout its command structure, resulting from historical 
strong and weak horizontal ties established during Saddam Hussein’s former regime. 
These ties, exploited by Daesh leadership while held in U.S.-run detention facilities 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom and fomented following the U.S. withdrawal, form the 
foundation on which Daesh was built and continues to hold together the organization. 
B. DAESH SOCIOGRAM VISUAL DESCRIPTION 
The sociogram of Daesh (Figure 4), drawn in ORA, is depicted as a two-mode 
network consisting of aggregated one-mode networks for better visual analysis.87 The 
sociogram contains color-coded circles and squares. Circles represent individuals, or 
agents, and the squares represent organizations or institutions. The colored circles denote 
the reported location by country for each agent. There are three prominent colors: cyan 
                                                 
87 The two-mode networks mapped were agent (x) past military affiliations, agent (x) past government 
affiliations, and agent (x) academic universities, where past military affiliations includes the Republican 
Guard and jihadi organizations, past government affiliations includes the Baath Party, and academic 
universities are institutions of higher learning. Incorporating these two-mode networks in the aggregated 
network highlights the relationships between the agents and the organizations and how these agents are 
then arrayed in Daesh’s network. The ties between agents represent a superior/subordinate relationship 
while ties between agents and organizations represent an affiliation between the agent and the organization. 
The resulting sociogram is a better representation of the Daesh command structure and suggests reasons 
why certain agents hold the positions they do. The two-mode network was then folded into a one-mode 
network to compute the standard network analysis, which will be discussed later. 
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represents Syria; green represents Iraq; and red represents an unknown location. This 
helps distinguish Daesh’s two primary regional commands (RCs), the Iraqi regional 
command (IRC) and the Syrian regional command (SRC). Also depicted are recently 
established wilayat in Libya, Nigeria, Yemen, and Dagestan. Agents in black represent 
deceased Daesh members. The squares represent historical organizations to which agents 
have ties. Blue squares represent military and governmental organizations, such as the 
Baath Party, Iraqi Republican Guard, and various jihadi organizations and green squares 
represent academic institutions. 
 
 
















Positioned centrally in the cluster with majority red nodes, is Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi and his senior cabinet. The left cyan portion of the graph represents the SRC 
chain of command while the right green portion represents the IRC chain of command, 
from the regional emirs down to the wilayat level. Immediately above al-Baghdadi’s 
cabinet are assumed to be various advisors and colleagues of both al-Baghdadi and 
Mohammed al-Adnani, Daesh’s official spokesman. Directly below al-Baghdadi’s 
cabinet and between the two RCs represents al-Baghdadi’s Sharia Council, the primarily 
red circles, and the Yemeni wilaya chain of command in dark blue. The large green 
cluster on the far right portion of the IRC represents Wilaya Nineveh’s command 
structure while the large blue and red cluster above the SRC represents a known fighting 
unit called the Abu Shaheed Unit. The unattached clusters on the sociogram’s periphery 
represent various supporters and known Daesh members who do not have known direct 
ties to the chain of command.88  
C. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND NETWORKS 
Recalling Chapter II’s discussion on organization and mobilizing structures, 
Daesh follows Tarrow’s first and third aspects of organization, that of formal hierarchical 
organization and the use of abeyance structures, to begin its organization. Daesh 
leadership developed their own predefined set of goals through their interpretation of 
Quranic scripture and Salafi doctrine and set out to organize according to those goals. In 
doing so, those who were recruited had subscribed to the stated goals and doctrine and 
were placed in supporting leadership positions waiting for the call to mobilization when 
Daesh officially returned. This set the formal hierarchy depicted in the sociogram (Figure 
5). Once in power, Daesh then likely incorporated its new supporters into its subordinate 
command structure. In a sense, Daesh’s organization process followed Tarrow’s aspects 
of organization, permitting them to develop a burgeoning command structure with a 
                                                 
88 There are three assumption made that are worth mentioning when describing the sociogram. First, it 
is assumed that if an agent is a council member for a specific wilaya, then he has a relationship with all 
other council members of that wilaya. Second, wilaya governors have a relationship with each other as 
senior leaders within each regional command. Finally, similar to the first assumption, all members of al-
Baghdadi’s cabinet have a tie to each other. These assumptions are the underlying reasons why there are 
many cliques visually depicted. 
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supportive base waiting for the official mobilization call. That call came following 
Mosul’s capture and al-Baghdadi’s July announcement of the caliphate.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Daesh’s Mobilizing Structures 
D. LEADERSHIP: VERTICAL STRONG TIES 
Figure 6 depicts Daesh’s superior/subordinate relationships within its command 
structure. This is a directed sociogram where the more central the actor lies, the more 
senior his position while the further out from the center the actor, the less senior his 
position. The most central red circle is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the first green circle to his 
right is the IRC Emir, Fadel Ahmad Abdullah al-Hiyali, and the first blue circle to his left 
is the SRC Emir, Abu Ali al-Anbari. The red circles surrounding al-Baghdadi represent 




Figure 6.  Daesh superior/subordinate leadership sociogram 
Daesh’s initial mobilizing structures focused on establishing strong ties among its 
core leadership, as highlighted by the thicker lines depicted in the sociogram. Those with 
direct ties to al-Baghdadi and the RC Emirs have thicker ties, while those further out 
from the center have thinner ties. These thicker lines, or vertical strong ties, provide 
Daesh leadership with the necessary oversight to maintain strict control throughout the 
caliphate. Al-Baghdadi developed these vertical strong ties with those hardcore believers, 
many stemming from Saddam Hussein’s former regime, while serving time in U.S.-run 













1. Iraqi Baath Party and Republican Guard 
Sageman’s theory of horizontal weak ties is pertinent to understanding Daesh’s 
recruitment throughout the mid-2000s. It was likely horizontal strong ties stemming from 
previous occupations that allowed Daesh to operate successfully across a wide swathe of 
territory. Daesh leveraged the strengths of those with leadership experience from time 
served in either the Iraqi Baath Party or Republican Guard. Table 2 lists Baath Party and 
Republican Guard affiliates within Daesh, and Figure 7 shows where these individuals 
fall within the command structure—red circles represent Daesh members while blue 
circles represent Daesh members with Baath Party ties. They are either in senior 
leadership positions, directly tied to al-Baghdadi, or directly tied to other senior leaders, 
demonstrating the importance Daesh placed on individuals with leadership experiences.89 
Table 2.   Iraqi Baath Party and Republican Guard affiliates within Daesh 
Name Significance 
Adnan Ismail Majem Bilawi Former Senior Military Commander; Deceased 
Abu Saif al-Maslawi Direct tie to al-Baghdadi 
Samir Abd Muhammad Direct tie to al-Baghdadi; Deceased 
Muhammad Nada al-Jbouri Direct tie to al-Baghdadi 
Abu Ahmad al-Alwani Direct tie to al-Baghdadi 
Adnan Latif Hamid al-Sweidawi Wilaya Anbar Governor 
Fadel Ahmad Abdullah al-Hiyali Iraqi Regional Command Emir 
Abu Aqeel al-Hamdani Direct tie to al-Baghdadi 
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri Direct tie to Iraqi Regional Command Emir; Potential advisor to al-Baghdadi; Deceased 
Abu Muhannad Asuwaidawi Military Commander 
Abu Ali al-Anbari Syrian Regional Command Emir 
                                                 
89 Omar al-Jaffal, “Baath Spokesman Denies Alliance with Islamic State,” Al-Monitor, July 14, 2014. 
Accessed on December 18, 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/iraq-baath-
spokesman-denies-links-islamic-state.html; Whitcomb, Alexander. “Iraq Expert: ‘Insurgency Is as Much 
Old Baathist as It Is ISIS.’” Rudaw, June 29, 2014. Accessed December 18, 2014. 
http://rudaw.net/english/interview/29062014; Reuters. “Who Runs Islamic State?” Chicagotribune.com. 




Figure 7.  Former Iraqi Baath Party and Republican Guard members within 
Daesh command structure 
The significance of this is two-fold. First, these individuals provided the 
leadership needed to run large government and military organizations. Daesh’s success 
and perceived legitimacy relies on military victories and territorial control, a prerequisite 
to establish the caliphate according to Daesh’s philosophy.90 Therefore, it was imperative 
for Daesh to employ those with these experiences. Second, they provided a form of 
organic leadership capital that commands respect from Deash members and the 
population under its control. While this analysis cannot directly ascertain the extent of 
organic leaders, there is a strong likelihood that these individuals then used their previous 
social bonds to recruit and employ colleagues to serve in leadership positions under their 
command. This would have ensured a command structure with similar training, expertise, 
and ideologies and supports the vertical strong ties that permeate the caliphate’s 
mobilizing structures. 
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E. BROKERAGE AND CONNECTIVE TISSUES: HORIZONTAL WEAK 
TIES 
As outlined in Chapter II, brokerage depends on three critical components – the 
right actor serving as a broker, the right medium in which a broker operates, and constant 
network analysis to adjust for efficient brokerage operations. In the evolution of the 
Islamic State, Daesh leaders invested time and effort in developing new horizontal weak 
ties to expand their brokerage capacity. The jihadi battlefields and U.S.-run prisons 
served as the breeding ground for establishing these weak ties,91 helping to rebuild an 
organization that was left for dead following the 2007 Sunni Awakening.92 From that 
time, Daesh’s core leadership began building weak tie relationships with like-minded 
individuals, who in turn formed their own weak ties, and so on. This process, emanating 
from Camp Bucca, continued over the years and the results of these efforts are witnessed 
on a much larger scale today.93 
1. Camp Bucca 
A critical component in al Qaeda’s (AQ) recruitment process was the “pre-
existing social bonds” where the nearly 80% of the recruits came from either kinship or 
friendship ties while only 10% joined out of religious beliefs.94 This concept worked for 
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a growing AQ, the precursor to Daesh.95 It stands to reason, then, that Daesh would 
implement this already proven strategy. Assuming this to be true, prime-recruiting 
conditions existed during Operation Iraqi Freedom when coalition forces arrested 
disenfranchised young jihadis and consolidated them in U.S.-run prisons. It was here, 
specifically in Camp Bucca, that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began developing ties in the 
hopes of uniting disenfranchised Sunni insurgents under the Daesh flag.96 
During the early stages of Daesh’s development, conditions in U.S.-run detention 
facilities served as the proper medium for Daesh’s initial brokers to operate. Al-Baghdadi 
took advantage of his time in Camp Bucca to develop critical relationships with 
likeminded detainees to support Daesh’s future rise. He found the right men to serve as 
his core leaders and who would likely serve as future brokers following their release from 
prison. Figure 8 depicts those that served time in Camp Bucca. One can see that those 
who spent time in Camp Bucca, presumably at the same time as al-Baghdadi or with his 
close confidants, were later rewarded with senior leadership positions. Given Sageman’s 
theory, it would follow that those who were closely associated with these individuals, i.e. 
associates with pre-existing social bonds or horizontal weak ties, were likely placed in 
leadership positions as well. 
Given the right operational medium, Camp Bucca, and a collection of the right 
men, all Daesh leadership needed was to continually monitor the network following their 
release to ensure the chosen brokers operated appropriately following their own release. 
Given Daesh’s speedy success, it is fair to suggest that their brokerage operations were 
monitored appropriately. 
                                                 
95 “What Is Islamic State?” BBC News. September 26, 2014, accessed on December 18, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.  
96 Martin Chulov, “Isis: The inside Story,” The Guardian, December 11, 2014, accessed on December 
19, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story. 
 48
 
Figure 8.  Daesh leaders who served time in Camp Bucca 
2. Brokerage and Brokerage Potential 
Brokerage and brokerage potential provides analysts a better understanding of a 
network’s inner workings, its foundational structure, and its critical facilitating nodes. In 
a sense, it is these nodes, and their associated strong and weak ties, that serve as the 
skeletal frame responsible for holding the network together. Identifying them and 
understanding their relational intricacies offers a clearer picture of network operations, 
thus allowing strategists to develop more efficient disruption strategies. The metrics used 
in this thesis to identify these individuals are betweenness centrality, boundary spanner 









to which each actor lies on the shortest path between all other actors in a network.”97 
Actors with high betweenness values are have the potential to be influential and have a 
greater tendency of bringing together multiple groups of people that may not otherwise 
be associated. ORA defines Boundary spanner potential as those nodes that have the 
ability to connect disconnected groups,98 and it is calculated by dividing an actor’s 
betweenness centrality score by their degree centrality score, which is simply a count of 
their ties.99 Ron Burt developed his measure of constraint in order to identify those gaps 
in a network that bridging ties span.100 It measures “the degree to which each node… is 
constrained from acting because of its existing links to other nodes.”101 Therefore, the 
less constrained a node, the greater brokerage potential and a higher sense of autonomy it 
possesses.102 In other words, lower levels of constraint indicate higher levels of 
brokerage potential. Together these metrics provide in-depth empirical measures that 
highlight nodes with actual and potential bridging and brokerage capabilities. Table 3 
represents the brokerage metrics used in this research. 
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Table 3.   Brokerage metrics103 
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3. Daesh’s Brokerage and Brokerage Potential 
Daesh’s network is framed around a number of key individuals whose duties and 
responsibilities provide Daesh its operational coordination. The top three agents are Fadel 
Ahmad Abdullah al-Hiyali, Abu Ali al-Anbari, and Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri 
al-Samari, the IRC emir, SRC emir, and caliph respectively; they represent three of the 
most senior ranking commanders within Daesh’s network. Both al-Hiyali and al-Anbari 
served as intelligence officers in Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard, suggesting they 
have connections with former Republican Guard factions with similar ideologies and 
convictions. This would have allowed them to serve as brokers in recruiting those 
factions into Daesh’s movement. The three have the highest betweenness centrality 
values, demonstrating their actual brokerage value, and rate in the top ten and top twenty 
for boundary spanner potential and Burt’s constraint value, respectively. The combination 
of these values demonstrates their importance in terms of coordinating major clusters 
within the network, coinciding with the visual analysis of the network. 
The next two actors of note are the Iraqi and Syrian Sharia Council Muftis, Abu 
Abdullah al-Kurdi and Syria Sharia Council Leader Mufti (actual name is unknown). 
Their betweenness centrality values rate them in the top eleven, demonstrating the 
importance Daesh has placed on the Sharia Council and its leadership. When comparing 
their brokerage potential, however, both individuals rank in the top four of boundary 
spanner potential and Burt’s constraint value. This may be the most significant find 
within this data as traditional thinking may place more influence on the regional emirs 
and the caliph given their duty positions. The boundary spanner potential and Burt’s 
constraint values, however, suggest that the Sharia Council leaders’ brokerage potential 
are statistically more important than the regional emirs and the caliph. Reports have 
suggested that the Sharia council is the true decision maker within the caliphate.104 Thus, 
it is noteworthy that Abu Mohammed al-Aani, al-Baghdadi’s senior Sharia Council 
leader within his cabinet, scores within the top ten for both betweenness centrality and 
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Burt’s constraint value, and ranks eighteenth in boundary spanner potential. The SNA 
metrics, therefore, lend support to the notion that the Sharia Council wields significant 
power, both actual and potential, within Daesh. 
Additional significant individuals are Daesh wilayat governors. Three wilaya 
governors to note are Nineveh’s al-Khatouni, Kirkuk’s al-Jihaishi, and Anbar’s al-
Sweidawi. Both Kirkuk and Anbar’s governors are significant because of the importance 
each region plays in Daesh’s Iraq conquest. Kirkuk is home to Daesh’s toughest 
resistance, the Kurdish Pershmerga, and continues to be one of the only Iraqi regions that 
have experienced military successes against Daesh. Anbar’s historical significance to 
Daesh, and to a larger extent Iraq, cannot be overstated. As the birthplace of the Sunni 
Awakening that ousted al-Qaeda in Iraq and home to the Sunni Triangle’s, Daesh’s desire 
to control Anbar is undeniable. Therefore the importance of both Kirkuk and Anbar’s 
governors supports their high betweenness centrality. 
The governor of significance, however, is Abdallah Yousef Abu Bakr al-
Khatouni, the Wilaya Nineveh Governor. While his metrics may be skewed because of 
the concentration of nodes coded from Nineveh, it is interesting to note that Nineveh 
contains the city of Mosul. Mosul plays a significant role in Daesh’s recent history. First, 
al-Baghdadi announced the caliphate’s establishment in Mosul’s grand mosque. Second, 
Mosul’s capture marks Daesh’s first significant military victory. Third, after its fall, with 
the Iraq Security Forces deserting its posts and equipment for Daesh capture, Mosul has 
been a source of motivation and pride for the Daesh faithful. Finally, Mosul continues to 
be the largest city under Daesh control throughout the caliphate. Therefore, while the data 
may be skewed, it is logical that the provincial governor that oversees Mosul would be an 
influential member in the command structure. Given this logic, the Wilaya Raqqah 
governor, who controls the de-facto Deash capital of ar-Raqqah, would be an influential 
actor within the SRC. The empirical data, however, does not currently support this 
assumption. 
The final Daesh member to note is a senior member in al-Baghdadi’s cabinet, 
Abdullah Ahmed al-Meshedani. He controls the Fighter Assistance Council, a crucial 
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position given the importance Daesh places on its military.105 While he does not register 
in the top twenty in terms of Burt’s constraint, this does not diminish his overall potential 
value. Foreign fighters make up a significant portion of Daesh’s network with more 
immigrating to the caliphate with relative frequency.106 It is imperative, then, that the 
individual who manages the flow of foreign fighters is both influential, a strong leader, 
and connected with multiple groups throughout the network in order to deploy incoming 
foreign fighters. The SNA metrics support this assumption. 
 Comparing the sociogram’s visual analysis and the brokerage metrics supports 
the idea that Daesh is a hierarchical organization whose structure allows for a centralized 
leadership structure controlling a decentralized operating structure. Given the redundancy 
of council positions throughout the command structure, each can operate as an 
autonomous organization while still making available orders and direction from senior 
commands. The actors who score highest in terms of betweenness centrality are centrally 
located in the sociogram, suggesting their brokerage role within the organization. The 
remaining top ten, save Abu Shaheed, each hold dominating positions in the sociogram as 
well as within the Daesh command structure relative to their compatriots. Therefore, both 
the visual and analytical analyses have highlighted potentially key influential actors 
within Daesh. 
F. OPERATIONAL CELLS: HORIZONTAL STRONG TIES 
Daesh’s operational level cells, or wilaya command structures, consist of multiple 
cliques held together by horizontal strong ties. These cliques provide uniformity in 
governance, a critical component in Daesh’s mobilizing structure, to provide a sense of 
operational cohesion. Each wilaya, headed by a governor, is comprised of identical 
command structures consisting of four primary councils – Sharia Council, Shura Council, 
Military Council, and Security Council. Together they regulate daily life according to the 
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rules and regulations outlined by al-Baghdadi and his senior cabinet. The horizontal 
strong ties within these cliques are the unifying factor within the wilayat command 
structure. Given Daesh’s aforementioned recruitment methodology, the leaders of these 
councils likely utilized their own horizontal strong ties to recruit locally to build their 
councils. This local recruitment likely offered a sense of leadership capital within their 
own wilaya, helping to further legitimize Daesh’s population control.  
According to recently released documents from the alleged Deash mastermind, 
Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi a.k.a. Haji Bakr, controlling the population was 
paramount in establishing the caliphate, more so than “fanatical religious convictions.”107 
Therefore, it was imperative that Deash leadership recruited calculating individuals 
capable of manipulating religious fervor in favor of Daesh’s grand plan. This involved 
filling Daesh ranks with individuals who served under Saddam Hussein’s regime and 
could incorporate those leadership experiences in Daesh’s formation. While 
governmental and military leadership experience proved crucial in forming Daesh, so too 
was espionage and surveillance expertise. In this secretive world, trust plays a vital role 
and al-Khalifawi required individuals he could trust to ensure his master plan was 
executed unimpeded.108 As witnessed within Daesh’s senior level leadership, horizontal 
strong ties stemming from Saddam Hussein’s former regime likely provided this trust at 
the operational level as well. 
G. CONCLUSION:  DAESH’S MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
This chapter discussed Daesh’s formation through a social network analysis and 
mobilizing structures. It demonstrated that Daesh’s overall network is characterized by a 
unified leadership command structure with vertical strong ties that permeate the entire 
network. These vertical strong ties originated in Saddam Hussein’s regime, were rebuilt 
and reinforced throughout the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and came to fruition in 2014 
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during Daesh’s blitzkrieg in northern Iraq. Conditions in U.S. detainee camps permitted 
Daesh to develop its brokerage capacity through horizontal weak ties, allowing Daesh to 
pool together highly skilled men with the necessary expertise to support Daesh’s rise. 
From these horizontal weak ties grew horizontal strong ties, forming the operational level 
cliques needed to control the population and solidify the caliphate’s establishment. It is 
the breadth and depth of this tie construct, as demonstrated by the supporting SNA 
metrics, that provides Daesh the strength and resiliency to not only endure, but also 
outlast, the international coalition’s attempts to defeat it. This also means these brokers 
have the potential to be internal fracturing points, a critical assumption when developing 
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V. A SOCIALLY UNCONVENTIONAL STRATEGY 
Implementing an alternative strategy to combat Daesh using Irregular Warfare 
(IW) as an analytical framework requires a distinct and separate construct than that of 
traditional military thinking. IW is a violent struggle for legitimacy and influence.109 As 
such, this chapter discusses a strategy designed to undermine Daesh’s sources of 
legitimacy and influence, derived from social movement theory. It discusses three lines of 
effort to implode Daesh’s cohesion: develop a counter-narrative, disrupt Daesh’s 
network, and limit its political opportunities. It should be noted that results of this 
strategy would be hard to detect in the near term; thus, it will require strategic patience 
and persistence. Additionally, this thesis data is not the most current available because 
the data collection was bounded from January to March of 2015. This problem set is 
changing daily. Implementing portions of this strategy, specifically the kinetic targeting 
operations, requires updated research and data collection. 
In the end, this strategy has three goals. First, it seeks to provide a counter-
narrative highlighting Daesh’s illegitimacy in order to dry up Daesh’s recruiting pool and 
prevent Daesh from growing its human capital. Second, it offers network disruption 
strategies through a combination of kinetic operations and social unrest intended to 
fracture Daesh’s cohesion. Finally, it intends to prevent the caliphate’s future growth by 
limiting internal and external political opportunities. 
A. THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE 
The first line of effort requires a strong, resonating counter-narrative consisting of 
three primary themes. The first should highlight the fraudulent nature of Daesh’s 
governance and its overall existence. Daesh claims it is the caliphate’s protectorate, as 
preordained by Allah, to rule over the one true religion, Daesh’s extreme version of Sunni 
Islam. This notion, however, is highly contested in the Muslim world, most notably by 
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senior level defectors from within al-Baghdadi’s Sharia Council.110 To develop this 
theme, strategists must first gain an understanding as to why those who defected did so 
and then intensify their reasoning into a stronger message. Wrapping this theme around 
Islamic jurisprudence and literature is essential for its development. It must be clear 
enough so that other individuals can substantiate its claims through their own 
interpretations of the Quran and the Hadith, which are the same sets of Islamic literature 
that Daesh uses for its own justification. The aforementioned defectors are the individuals 
needed to do this for several reasons. First, they provide a sense of religious legitimacy 
given their senior positions within al-Baghdadi’s Sharia Council. Second, they have an 
intimate understanding of how the caliphate operates and can craft a penetrating message. 
Third, they possess a profound knowledge of the Islamic literature needed to craft that 
message. Finally, they possess a sense of organic leadership capital that will lend 
credibility to the theme.  
The second theme highlights the petty political nature of Daesh’s leadership, in 
which former Baathists are using Daesh as a platform from which to regain control of 
Iraq. This theme should not imply that the official Baath Party supports Daesh, but rather 
that a group of power-hungry individuals with Baath Party ties are trying to return to 
dominance given the recent power vacuum following the United States’ withdraw in 
2011. Given the structural similarities of Daesh’s chain of command to that of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, the secretive roots on which it was formed, and the pervasive nature of 
Iraqi nationals throughout its chain of command,111 it is reasonable to suggest that 
Daesh’s intent to establish an Islamic State is a thin veil masking its true intentions. This 
can be a powerful theme, especially to foreign fighters in Syria who are fighting out of 
religious fervor. Baathists, therefore, are using Daesh as a means to recruit human capital, 
primarily through foreign fighters, in order to pave their way back to prominence. So 
while Daesh may claim religious benevolence, this is purely a farce to build an army 
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strong enough to control the Sunni population in route to retaking control of Iraq. This 
theme leads to the final theme, that of Iraqi nationalism.   
The third theme must revitalize Iraqi nationalism. This may be the most difficult 
given the exclusive nature of the Shiite-dominated government of Iraq (GOI) and the 
Iranian influence in Baghdad. It is imperative, then, that the United States pressures the 
GOI into uniting Iraq under one flag by including Sunnis in national governance. This 
serves two purposes. First, it offers the Sunni tribes an organic sense of belonging. Until 
this occurs, alienated Sunni tribes have no other recourse but to support Daesh, be it 
actively or passively, for their own self-preservation. Currently, Daesh is the only “state” 
entity that provides Sunni tribes with a voice and a sense of power within Iraq. Until the 
Sunnis have options beyond terrorist organizations such as Daesh, al Qaeda, or some 
future extremist organizations, they will continue to offer their support to the 
organization that looks out for the Sunnis’ best interests. Second, this theme undermines 
both Iranian efforts to control Baghdad and Daesh’s anti-Shiite rhetoric. Iran and Daesh 
benefit from a disjointed Iraq. A unified Iraqi nation serves to counter Iranian influence 
while simultaneously marginalize Daesh’s appeal. 
Developing the appropriate themes, however, is only the first step. The second, 
and arguably more important, step is the delivery. The counter-narrative needs an 
appropriate mouthpiece, which in turn requires an appropriate dissemination platform. 
Those chosen to serve as the counter-narrative’s voice must possess high levels of social 
capital capable of putting a socially resonating spin on the themes. That message must 
then be delivered on platforms beyond basic interviews and media releases, but must be 
permanent and pervasive across all domains – social media, chat rooms, blogs, weekly 
sermons at mosques, Islamic study groups, and social events to name a few examples. No 
matter how accurate, or perceived to be accurate, these themes may be, if they are not 
delivered in an unrelenting, widespread manner that can be effectively absorbed by 
masses, the counter-narrative will, in effect, be a moot point. 
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B. DISRUPTING THE NETWORK 
The second line of effort focuses on disrupting Daesh’s network through three 
lines of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. To begin, kinetic 
operations should continue targeting Daesh leadership at the strategic level. The previous 
chapter identified several key individuals, for example the two regional emirs, Abu Ali 
al-Anbari and Fadel Ahmad Abdullah al-Hiyali. While Daesh likely has identified 
replacements in the event its strategic level leaders are eliminated, one can assume those 
replacements are less competent than the primaries. The primary leaders were chosen 
because of their leadership experiences in governmental and military organizations, 
otherwise they would not have assumed those leadership roles at the onset. The long-term 
effectiveness of kinetic targeting operations, however, can be highly uncertain given the 
potential “shadowy cabinet” made up of Baathist individuals.112 Additionally, given 
Daesh’s organizational maturity and pronounced religious motivations, kinetically 
targeting its leadership is unlikely to completely destroy the movement as mature, 
religious organizations have demonstrated resiliency in the face of decapitation 
strategies.113 Regardless, eliminating Daesh’s leadership will disrupt the network and its 
overall command and control capacity to a degree. 
The second line of operation requires disrupting Daesh’s brokerage capabilities at 
the operational level. This line of operation should be the priority to induce Daesh’s 
implosion, as Daesh’s brokerage operations serve as its unifying force. This disruption 
strategy has two approaches. The first approach is to identify and eliminate Daesh 
brokers. Chapter IV identified some senior level brokers, the Iraqi and Syrian Sharia 
Council Muftis, wilayat governors, and Abdullah Ahmed al-Meshedani for example. 
This, like targeting Daesh senior leadership, is also highly uncertain. Identifying Daesh 
brokers is very difficult, especially at the grassroots level, and conducting operations to 
eliminate them is even harder still. The well-earned results, however, would help fracture 
Daesh’s network, leading to a less cohesive organization. The second approach is to pre-
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emptively co-opt Sunni groups to make them unavailable to Daesh. Regardless of 
Daesh’s brokerage capabilities, if there are no groups for Daesh to broker, then Daesh’s 
brokerage capabilities are a non-starter. Either way, preventing Daesh from maintaining a 
unified organization, i.e. minimizing its brokerage capacity, will severely disrupt its 
operational capabilities. 
The final line of operation disrupts Daesh’s tactical capabilities through a three-
pronged approach. The first approached stems from the aforementioned co-optation of 
Sunni groups. In addition to preventing brokerage capacity, co-opting Sunni groups 
eliminates pools from which Daesh can recruit or coerce membership. It is widely 
accepted that gaining and maintaining Sunni allegiances is critical in defeating Daesh. 
This is evidenced by Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Units tabling their religious 
differences to partner with Sunni tribes in tactical efforts to defeat Daesh.114 In order for 
Iran to advance its strategic interest in Baghdad, it must first protect Baghdad by assisting 
it in eliminating the threat that is Daesh. If Iran then proves to be that pivotal force in 
Daesh’s defeat, Iran will have the freedom to continue its influence campaign in Iraq 
while encouraging a stronger Iraq/Iran relationship. In the end, Iraq will be pulled further 
into Iran’s sphere of influence by helping defeat the threat to Shiite dominance, and 
further solidify itself as the regional power player. To counter this, the United States must 
beat Iran to the Sunni tribes and co-opt these pre-existing social Sunni movements while 
simultaneously encouraging the GOI to be more nationalistic and include Sunnis in 
national level governance. 
The second approach involves co-opting local civil services within the caliphate 
to begin sowing the seeds of civil unrest. To do so in an oppressive regime, such as the 
caliphate, the movement must be rooted in organizations that are shielded from regime 
attacks because those organizations are as integral to the regime as they are to the 
population in which the movement exists. Like Poland’s Solidarity movement of the 
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1980s, where the resistance was heavily involved in the Catholic Church,115 a resistance 
movement founded in the caliphate’s civil services can provide that same protective 
shield. Much of Daesh’s clientelist-like propaganda focuses on its state-provided 
services, which includes water, electricity, gas, sewage and trash removal, education, 
medical care, and security. While Daesh touts its ability to provide these amenities, its 
ability to do so effectively remains in question.116 Herein lays the exploitable 
vulnerability. Co-opting civil services and encouraging subversive activities will not only 
exacerbate the already tense relations between Daesh and the population, but will also 
promote civil unrest through collective action. As the collective action grows, with the 
intent of reaching Arab Spring popularity, Daesh’s inability to control the population will 
both undermine its credibility and encourage its implosion.  
The final approach is to map the Daesh-affiliated Dawah offices throughout the 
region and begin interdiction operations to reduce their influence. The Dawah offices, 
Islamic missionary centers, were instrumental in Daesh’s rise. These centers opened 
under the auspices of supporting local communities. In fact, their intent was to provide 
Daesh a platform to disseminate its message, collect massive amounts of information 
about the local community, and serve as a base of operations for Daesh spies. In the end, 
they were critical in producing the information Daesh leadership required for its 
territorial takeover.117 Mapping out the Dawah network will shed light on Daesh 
beginnings, illuminate how Daesh was able to spread between Syria and Iraq so quickly, 
provide insight on local level influencers, and provide greater options with which to 
develop additional disruption strategies. 
C. LIMITING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
The final line of effort requires limiting Daesh’s political opportunities through 
two lines of operation, external and internal. Externally, the United States should help 
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regional partners enhance their border security to stem the influx of foreign fighters. This 
assistance should extend beyond the Middle East into North Africa and Mediterranean 
nations, as a vast majority of foreign fighters destined for the caliphate travel through 
countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Cyprus.118 While these countries would 
benefit from this support at traditional border crossing sites, the focus should shift to non-
traditional border crossing mechanisms, such as smuggling routes, ratlines, and 
facilitators. Disrupting Daesh’s human capital flow would degrade its military 
capabilities, constrain its basic life sustaining services, and support the previously 
outlined network disruption strategies. 
The second line of operation requires building an internal, Sunni-dominate 
coalition to undermine Daesh’s exploitation of disenfranchised Sunni groups. This serves 
two purposes beyond that of co-opting Sunni groups to promote the aforementioned civil 
unrest. First, it continues to dry up Daesh’s local support base and, second, it undermines 
Iranian efforts to create a Shiite-dominate, anti-Daesh coalition. Critical to this line of 
operation is the full support from the GOI. Without an inclusive GOI, Sunni groups will 
continue to remain on the fringe and look to outside organizations for power and 
acceptance. To bring the GOI in line, the U.S. support that includes arms, personnel, 
training, and finances must no longer be unconditional; to continue receiving U.S. aid, 
the GOI must include Sunnis equally. This stipulation cannot be negotiable. As long as 
the United States provides unconditional aid to the GOI, it will continue to operate in an 
exclusive manner, as encouraged by Iran, and further alienate half of its population. The 
GOI must be willing to govern the entirety of its citizenry equally,119 otherwise it risks 
having a portion of its population in a constant state of insurrection. This line of effort 
intends to further isolate the caliphate such that over time its expansion opportunities 
would be reduced to zero.  
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Given the rapid manner in which Daesh absorbed portions of Iraq and Syria, it is 
natural to look for an equally rapid response in which to defeat Daesh. This problem set, 
however, has been developing since the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Daesh’s 
strategic patience following its near destruction in 2007 is one to admire and should not 
be taken lightly. This demonstrates its ability and willingness to plan and execute 
operations with long-term strategic goals in mind. Daesh’s expertly crafted and 
methodically executed campaign plan allowed it to envelope its entire society, leaving 
nothing to chance by controlling every aspect of daily life. Its resonating narrative, 
deeply rooted in Islamic ideology, tugs at the hearts and minds of its recruiting audience 
to ensure a constant flow of human capital. Its military operations are planned and led by 
top-notch commanders with a wealth of experience stemming from Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. Its governmental leadership is well-versed in controlling a population, also 
stemming from the former regime. While this seems like a combination destined for 
success, its drawbacks are many. 
The caliphate is not sustainable if the United States executes an appropriate 
counter-strategy focused on these drawbacks. Daesh’s narrative, while deeply rooted in 
Islamic lore, can be undermined if the United States leverages the appropriate individuals 
to develop a counter-narrative that calls into question Daesh’s perceived legitimacy. 
Continued pressure on Daesh’s military through targeted kinetic strikes and sustained 
pressure from Iraq’s military, with conditional U.S. support, will eventually degrade 
Daesh’s military capacity altogether while simultaneously undermine Iranian efforts to 
control Iraq. Further targeting Daesh’s governmental leadership, combined with co-
optation of key social populations that include Sunni groups and civil services, will 
degrade Daesh’s ability to control the population and promote civil unrest. Combined, 
these lines of effort can contribute to Daesh’s implosion. Once Daesh begins to fracture 
under its own weight, the GOI can then systematically reestablish its control over lost 
territory with the help of newly integrated Sunni groups and U.S. support. This combined 
strategy, however, requires more in depth knowledge of Daesh’s network. 
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To support this strategy, future research should continue mapping the Daesh 
network as this thesis merely mapped its strategic and operational levels of command 
based on available open source information. This thesis outlined the importance of 
human domain mapping in Chapter III and was able to demonstrate this by identifying 
Daesh’s Baathist roots prior to the mass media’s reporting on the subject. Continued 
mapping efforts will likely identify additional groups and individuals that are key Daesh 
influencers. It is recommended that Saddam Hussein’s entire Baath Party and Republican 
Guard be mapped out, beginning with the known entities identified within this research. 
These efforts will likely illuminate ties to others with similar experiences and ideological 
mindsets, thus increasing the probability those individuals are Daesh members as well. 
There is an insatiable desire to know who is in Daesh, from lowly foreign fighters to the 
most senior commanders. Human domain mapping not only provides that knowledge, but 
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